Larry Myers: An Ignored Political Prisoner

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People within mainstream American culture typically view incarcerated political dissidents as uninteresting. Given that the entertainment value for such cases is usually quite low because they lack sensationalism, popular support is notoriously absent. Despite the fact that donating to legal defense funds which pay bar attorneys is counter-productive, what I am surprised about is how almost no one desires to learn from, or is even bothered by, what happens when you are sent to an American gulag.




In August of 2011, Larry Mikiel Myers was arrested on various counts of conspiracy to intimidate government agents. The following January, a demand for habeas corpus was served on his behalf, yet it was ignored by all the recipients. His trial commenced anyway on February 9th, in a flagrant violation of due process; he was subsequently convicted on all counts three days later.

What exactly led to such a state of affairs for Larry Myers? To answer that question, we must go back into the past and examine how a series of interrelated events were set in motion by the domino effect. Spanning the course of about 20 years, the story of how Larry Myers came to be incarcerated, and remains so today, is certainly one well worth learning if you care about human liberty.

Philip Marsh was indicted by a federal grand jury in November of 1993 for conspiracy to defraud the United States. His trial and that of his co-defendants began in August of 1994, ending in November with a hung jury. A retrial was eventually held, and by December of 1995, Marsh was convicted by a jury on numerous counts of violating 18 USC § 371, 26 USC § 7212, 26 USC § 7201, 26 USC § 7203, & 18 USC § 1341; he was sentenced seven months later to 17 years and 6 months in prison. In the United States v. Marsh, 98 C.D.O.S. 3974 (1998) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit chose to reverse most of the convictions for Marsh and his co-defendants, yet that court affirmed every single conviction of 26 USC §§ 7201 & 7203 for all defendants. Marsh was able to get his sentence reduced down to a total of 7 years in prison because of this appellate decision, yet the reason for his sentence was because he had violated mala prohibita by his “willful failure to file tax returns” and for “tax evasion.”

Emilio Ippolito was indicted by a federal grand jury in March of 1996 for conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States. His trial and that of his co-defendants began in May, ending in August of 1997 with a mixture of acquittals and convictions. In the United States v. Carpa, No. 98-2797 (2001) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit chose to affirm the judgment of the district court.

Not only was Philip Marsh a co-defendant of Ippolito’s, but so was Larry Myers. What happened here was that Ippolito and his group decided to mail some letters to the jurors who were on the second Marsh trial, because they felt that Marsh’s right to due process was being violated. As Gary Hunt described it at the time:


“The Tampa trial was based upon the defendants attempting to educate judges and juries that treason would constitute violation of the Constitution in convicting people for crimes they did not commit. The first jury determined that Marsh, et al, did not commit a crime. The second jury was denied the evidence (witnesses, i. e. Sixth Amendment right) that prevented conviction in the first trial. However, this is not Obstruction of Justice. Perhaps, however, it is Obstruction of the Constitution. It was these concerns that prompted the Tampa Common Law Court to advise the jurors and the judges that they were not acting in their proper capacity in the Marsh second trial.”


Yet such education and advice was interpreted by the government as if it were a crime unto itself. If mailing letters were sufficient for causing a tort, then wouldn’t that mean notices from the IRS demanding payment from an individual therefore mean he is their victim? That’s the double standard right there – if they threaten to extort you, that’s okay because “it’s the law,” but the second you do what they consider to be the same to them, all of a sudden it becomes a “crime.”

Larry Myers was indicted, in March of 1996 alongside Ippolito, on the following five counts, specifically:

  1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States 18 USC § 371
  2. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer 18 USC § 372
  3. Mailing threatening communications (on 7/15/94) – 18 USC §§ 876 & 2
  4. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally (on 8/27/94) – 18 USC §§ 1503 & 2
  5. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally (on 9/20/94) – 18 USC §§ 1503 & 2


According the indictment:


“Defendant Myers signed ‘Militia…Arrest Warrants’ in his capacity as a ‘Militia Volunteer’ and ‘Constitutional Common Law Enforcement Officer.’ These ‘arrest warrants’ were based on the CLC ‘contempt order’ of the same date, and were directed at Judge Walker and the other ‘respondents…’ Myers…mailed and caused to be mailed, the CLC ‘contempt order’ of August 27, 1994, together with the ‘arrest warrant’ of that date, to Judge Walker and the other ‘respondents….’ Myers signed ‘arrest warrants’ for the petit jury members, alternates and the defense attorneys who represented defendant Marsh [in the other case]. The ‘arrest warrants’ identified the alternate jurors by name and badge number…[and] Myers…mailed and caused to be mailed from Tampa, Florida, the CLC ‘contempt orders’ and ‘arrest warrants’ to Judge Walker, the jurors, alternate jurors, and the other ‘respondents.’”


So, by simply mailing letters expressing his displeasure with the federal government’s conduct of Marsh’s tax case, Myers committed a statutory violation despite the fact there was neither a breach of contract nor any real victim (in light of the fourth branch of government, I checked the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules for the Code of Federal Regulations and the United States Code just to see if any of the Administrative Agencies were involved by default, and thankfully, there was no CFR equivalent to the USC sections he was charged under).

Now, you may be asking, why was Larry Myers conspicuously absent from the United States v. Carpa case? It wasn’t as if he acquitted by the government, otherwise they would’ve mentioned it, just as they did with Richard Brown (who was another one of the co-defendants), so what exactly happened to Myers after the indictment? Apparently, unlike his fellow co-defendants, Myers simply never showed up for the trial, and he eventually moved to Arkansas. He was never heard from again until his arrest over two years ago. Because Myers was able to avoid “the long arm of the law” for 15 years, I suspect that a man like that would get arrested only if someone chose to snitch on him, although I will admit I cannot prove it. Regardless, his 2012 conviction was solely based upon the 1996 indictment.

After his arrest, Myers’ sister contacted Gary Hunt for assistance. Hunt was able to secure a specific power of attorney on Myers’ behalf. Following Myers’ conviction, Hunt mailed a letter to Pinellas County Florida Sheriff Bob Gualtieri saying that it was wrong for him to refuse service on Myers’ earlier habeas corpus back in January, because it was tantamount to denying habeas corpus, which is a violation of the United States Constitution’s Suspension Clause (besides the fact that such a denial was crucial to securing what became an unjust conviction). Unfortunately, this fell on deaf ears, and after slogging his way through various court clerks for the next few months, Hunt received a letter from Thomas Hall, the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, who told him that:


“In response to your filing received May 14, 2012, and related question, please be advised that analysis on your pleading would constitute legal advice. However, we are able to clarify that the pleading is deficient because it concerns a party prosecuted in federal court and currently incarcerated in a federal facility. As such, it must be filed in a federal court. We are returning it to you for that purpose.”


Besides the fact that the “federal facility” in question was not on ceded federal land, as required by the Constitution, because it is owned by Corrections Corporation of America, Incorporated, another federal clerk decided to jerk Hunt’s chain around by appearing to treat Myers’ habeas corpus as if it were an appeal. Because of this flagrant denial of habeas corpus, coupled with the equally bad denial of habeas corpus by John Ley (who is the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit), Hunt found himself in the position of having to submit Myers’ habeas corpus to none other than the United States Supreme Court.

Myers’ last recourse was to have the constitutionality of the laws he was charged with challenged, and this could only be done by the forcing of original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court due to the inaction of the lower courts. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in June of 2013, and the Court refused to hear it the following October, despite the fact that Hunt had corrected the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court William Suter’s amateur mistakes (such as changing the petition’s caption from In Re Larry Mikiel Myers to In Re Gary Hunt) in his emergency petition for a writ of mandamus. Hunt refiled the habeas corpus in a petition for rehearing in November of 2013, but this too the Court refused to hear in December.

For two whole years, Gary Hunt engaged in many rounds of correspondence with various government agents, especially court clerks, of both the Floridian and United States governments. Article 1 §13 of the Florida Constitution said that:


“The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is essential to the public safety.” [emphasis added]


How is remaining incarcerated for three months within the bounds of a habeas corpus “returnable without delay?” Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is legally described by Sir William Blackstone as being the great and efficacious writ in all matters of illegal confinement, and a high prerogative writ above all the other types of habeas corpus. It is also known as the “great writ of liberty,” or the Sacred Writ, and as such, it would be accurate to say that habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the guardian of liberty (and quite possibly one that could have functioned as a form of individual nullification, pursuant to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments). As such a guardian, the timeframe for the Sacred Writ to be answered in is even recognized by 28 USC § 2243:


“A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” [emphasis added]


For those of you who don’t know, the word “forthwith” means immediately. This doesn’t mean that the Court is obliged to rule in your favor, because habeas corpus is not a “get out of jail free card;” all that the Court is obliged to do is to respond to the Sacred Writ only in regards to the legality of the incarceration itself. How “immediate” is it for the United States Supreme Court to sit on Larry Myers’ habeas corpus ad subjiciendum for over six months? Color of law, anyone?

What are the implications of Larry Myers’ habeas corpus being denied by the United States Supreme Court twice? If the Court had heard his habeas corpus, and if they had also ruled that Myers’ incarceration was illegal, it still might not have overturned or reverse his conviction, but it certainly would’ve determined whether the federal government can charge people with crimes that have not been legislated by the United States Congress, but were in fact created by the Administrative Agencies. More significantly, it would’ve also legally determined the legitimacy of administrative law, and thus, and the fourth branch of government itself. The reason the various court clerks (such as Thomas Hall, John Ley, and especially William Suter) were trying to stonewall Myers’ habeas corpus was because they had assumed a power to protect the judges from ruling on matters that are within their purview, but that which is not within the scope of the clerks themselves. In essence, these court clerks have become gatekeepers, much like the doorkeeper in the “Before the Law” parable (which is mentioned in Franz Kafka’s novel, The Trial).

At this point, you might be asking what became of Larry Myers after his habeas corpus was refused to be heard by the Supreme Court? He still remains in prison serving out his 7 year sentence, as of today. Given that he has already experienced 2 years of that (barring any other charges and convictions he may incur while in prison), he is expected to be released sometime in 2019. If you are pondering why you haven’t heard about Larry Myers’ predicament more often on the Internet, it could be due to an intentional blackout by the Carousel of Carnivores within the alternative media, or it could be nothing more nefarious than simple indifference by those who’d rather solicit donations from you towards a legal defense fund scam.

Are there lessons to be learned from Larry Myers’ saga? First, and most importantly, just realize that habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is not anymore a guarantee of being able to challenge potentially illegal confinement, especially in a federal case. Although I will maintain that the Sacred Writ might still work in Texas (pursuant to Article 1 § 12 of the Texas Constitution & the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 11), I am not at all that optimistic, but it would require a test case in order to replicate the similar conditions Larry Myers faced to determine that for certain.

Another lesson to be learned is the fact that even if you avoid capture for being what the government considers to be a fugitive, all it takes is for one opportunistic or even careless individual to rat you out, no matter how innocently, thereby siccing the police on you. Whether or not paper-tripping could be helpful in this regard remains to be seen, but even if it were, the best identity documentation will only assist the Standing Army in capturing you if their informant simply alleges that you are not who you claim to be, but are instead a fugitive who deserves to be captured.

Yet another lesson would be to understand that supposedly issuing your own “arrest warrants” simply does not work. The fact of the matter is that the government monopoly courts only follow their own rules when it suits them, but you and I are always held strictly to them and are never allowed to deviate, such as what happened with the 1996 Tampa Florida Common Law Court trial with regards to felon Matthew Finch as “Juror #505.” As Gary Hunt wrote back in 1998:


“Ironically, the very case that attempted to quash the Common Law Courts is beginning to provide the proof that only in those Courts can we hope to find Justice.”


The reason why Hunt would say that is because the United States government, as George Mercier described it, could be collectively thought of as if it were a King. If accurate, then the concept that “the King can do no wrong” would certainly explain the actions and justifications given by judges and prosecutors, wouldn’t it? So, when it comes down to the technique of contacting government agents, doing so will always carry the risk of either you losing your cool by threatening them because they are infuriating, or, they will chose to falsely accuse you of losing it by threatening them because they are sore losers. This, more than anything, is why any direct contact you have with government agents should be done with the attitude of “killing them with kindness.” For an example of this being politely done, I will refer you to when I unregistered from the voter rolls.

Probably the most important lesson to learn is the fact that both the United States v. Marsh & United States v. Carpa cases were easily avoidable. Quite simply, the lesson from Marsh is that you shouldn’t sell phony document templates, and then file commercial liens against the federal government (although interestingly enough, Marsh & his co-defendants were all acquitted on those related charges, but were still punished anyway because the government’s spotlight was already on them); the lesson from Carpa is don’t mail judges any letters telling them how you plan to hold them accountable if they happen to railroad somebody.

If you are to take away any lesson from Larry Myers’ experience, it is that you must look before you leap, and study the lay of the land before you travel it. Although you can never be certain about how the government will apply their “laws” to you in particular circumstances, at the very least you have no excuses for not studying their statutory codes and their case law ahead of time in order to gauge the risk you’d be undertaking, if any at all. An ounce of prevention is worth of pound of cure, and seldom is it truer than when you are dealing with government tyranny.

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